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Throughout the Second World War, the Luftwaffe attacked Norwich on various 
occasions. The impact this had on the city was recorded visually on the ‘Norwich 
Bomb Map’. This cartographic depiction, however, only records a single 
‘horizontal’ component of the aerial ‘battlescape’. In reality, the aerial battlefield 
comprised a combination of Norwich’s air defences and the flightpaths of the 
Luftwaffe bombers, which existed in three-dimensional space. As other scholars 
have developed methodologies for reconstructing anti-aircraft ‘fire domes’, this 
article will combine these concepts with a new approach that reconstructs historic 
flightpaths to give a three-dimensional overview of Norwich’s ‘Gun Defended 
Area’. By examining all components of Norwich’s airspace, this article will 
demonstrate the importance of considering the vertical component of a 
battlescape.  
Keywords: Air defence; Luftwaffe; Norwich; airspace; bombscape; firedome; 
aerial battlescape 
Introduction 
For many cities in the UK during the Second World War, a visual record of bomb 
impact locations was recorded cartographically on a ‘Bomb Map’. These represent a 
landscape record of aerial bombing, or a ‘bombscape’ (Figure 1), but they are not 
‘neutral tools’: maps ‘actually represent “reality” selectively and are anything but 
objective’ (Johnson 2006, 85). It is essential, therefore, when working with maps to 
question and understand them in context (Fleming 2007, 93). This is especially 
important in analysing aspects of military aviation and the landscape of aerial bombing, 
when it is vital to remember that cartographic representations only depict the horizontal 
component of the battlescape.  
Examining the world from a bird’s eye viewpoint has long dominated the work 
of geographers (Graham and Hewitt 2012, 72). This approach ignores the ‘vertical 
dimension and tends to look across rather than to cut through the landscape’ (Weizman 
2002, 3, cited Graham 2004, 12). There has been, however, a growing awareness 
amongst scholars of the importance of incorporating a vertical dimension into the 
analysis of landscapes (Adey 2010; Graham 2004; Williams 2013; Baghel and Nüsser 
2015; Elden 2013; Weizman 2017; Harris 2015). It is not easy to depict airspaces 
cartographically (Crampton 2010, 96), but developments in aerial mobility, geographies 
of civil air travel and the geopolitics of airpower, have led to a more critical view of 
vertical space (Williams 2013, 254).  
The study of three-dimensional landscapes (von Schwerin et al. 2013; Campana 
et al. 2012; Dell’Unto et al. 2016; Stewart 2019) and air warfare (Cocroft and Wilson 
2006; Whorton 2002; Richardson 2008) are not new areas of research within the field of 
archaeology. To date, aviation archaeologists have generally focused their research on 
the Second World War (Tunwell, Passmore and Harrison 2016, 312), with work 
conducted on aircraft crashes (Holyoak 2002; Fuller and Quigg 2011), airfields (Lake 
2002; Moshenska 2012), and air defence (Dobinson 2001; Dobinson, Lake and 
Schofield 1997). Limited work, however, has been undertaken on the archaeology of 
aerial bombing (Tunwell, Passmore and Harrison 2016, 312). Those studies that have 
been conducted only focus on the landscape dimension (Tunwell, Passmore and 
Harrison 2015, 234).  
The work of Dorothy Sprague, Dirk Spennemann and Craig Poynter (Sprague 
2018; Spennemann 2017; Spennemann and Poynter 2019) combines three-dimensional 
analysis with aviation history. Sprague plotted the airspace of predefined approach 
zones to predict B-29 Superfortress crash sites in the Pacific Theatre of the Second 
World War. Working in the same geographical region, Spennemann and Poynter 
developed methodologies for reconstructing the ‘fire domes’ of Japanese anti-aircraft 
guns. The aim of this article is to combine the approaches devised by Sprague, 
Spennemann and Poynter, to develop the concepts of three-dimensional airspace 
analysis further, and to apply them to the city of Norwich (UK) during the Second 
World War. The author will present a new approach to plot the unpredictable flightpath 
of aircraft during a bomb run. By reconstructing the city’s airspace during the Second 
World War, this article will demonstrate the potential of using archival sources to 
reconstruct three-dimensional aerial battlescapes.  
Over the course of the Second World War, the experience of British cities to 
aerial bombardment by the Luftwaffe varied in intensity (Rugg 2004, 153). The 
damage, however, was uneven and relatively light in comparison to cities in Germany 
attacked by the air forces of the Allies (Larkham 2005, 4). Following the Battle of 
Britain in 1940, the main focus of the Luftwaffe’s bombing offensive was London. The 
raids on the capital accounted for approximately one-third of British civilian war 
casualties (Rugg 2004, 153). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the historiography of the 
Luftwaffe’s campaigns over the UK focuses on the Battle of Britain (Overy 2000; 
Overy 2010; Ray 1996; Cox 1990; Levine 2007) and the London Blitz (Calder 2008; 
Harrisson 1976; Fitzgibbon 1957; Moshenska 2010; Bell 2008; Hanauer 2014). A 
growing body of work, however, has started to highlight the destruction suffered by 
other British towns and cities (Hodgson 2015a; 2015b; Price 2000; Flinn 2008; Johnson 
2005). One of those cities is Norwich, in the county of Norfolk (Banger 1989; Bowman 
2012), which is the focus of this article.  
The author selected Norwich to trial a new approach at reconstructing historic 
flightpaths because its ‘Bomb Map’ survives (NRO ACC 2007/195). This map was 
maintained during the Second World War by the City Council’s Engineer's Department, 
forming part of the ‘Bomb Census’ established by the government to provide an 
overview of air raids on the UK. Norwich was one of the cities targeted by the 
Luftwaffe during the Baedeker Raids of 1942 so it also serves as a case study for the 
wider context of raids on the UK. A letter from Air Chief Marshal GD Harvey, Fighter 
Command, to the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Bomber Command, dated 9 
August 1942, states that Norwich ‘had been subjected to more air attacks than most 
cities in the country’ (Figure 2) (TNA AIR 13/42a). Norwich was bombed on various 
occasions and although it is uncertain whether Harvey was referring to the total number 
or the frequency of raids, sufficient information survives to allow new methods of 
analysing data from the Bomb Map to be tested.  
Although the focus of this article is the plotting of anti-aircraft (AA) fire domes 
and the flightpaths of the Luftwaffe’s aircraft in three-dimensional space, it is important 
to note that Norwich was protected by a wider landscape of air defence. This included 
searchlight positions and ‘Starfish’ decoys (TNA WO 166/189a; Dobinson 2000, 90). 
The raids on Norwich and the city’s defences also existed within the wider history of 
the Luftwaffe’s tactics and strategy and the development of the UK’s air defences. As 
both of these have been covered extensively elsewhere (Corum 1997; Corum and 
Muller 1998; Cooper 1981; Goss, Cornwell and Rauchbach 2010; Murray 1996; Mason 
1975; Killen 1967 for the Luftwaffe, and for the UK’s air defences Dobinson 2001; Pile 
1949; Kirby and Capey 1997), they will not be discussed in this article.  
Previous Approaches 
One of the first attempts to examine the strategic placing of defences within a landscape 
using Geographical Information Systems (GIS) was Colin Lacey in his study of the 
Second World War Taunton Stop Line ‘firesheds’ (Lacey 2003). The use of ‘viewshed 
analysis’ and ‘fields-of-fire’ were used subsequently in a number of conflict 
archaeology studies (Drexler 2004; Rowe 2005; Athanson 2006; Gonçalves, Almeida, 
and Rua 2016). This body of work has demonstrated that GIS could be used for the 
spatial analysis of defence sites and can make significant contributions to understanding 
the siting of structures within the landscape (Rowe 2012, 200). Although these studies 
took into account three-dimensional topographical data, the fields-of-fire were 
displayed in a two-dimensional format (Rowe 2014, 357). 
It was not until the work of Spennemann (2011, 335-337) that fields-of-fire were 
considered as a fire dome in three-dimensional space. In two articles, Spennemann, and 
then Spennemann and Poynter, employed three-dimensional spatial visualisation in their 
interpretation of the Second World War Pacific island battlefield of Kiska (Spennemann 
2017; Spennemann and Poynter 2019). Their methodological approach combined the 
depressed AA gun elevation with weight of ammunition, rate of fire and the number of 
guns in an emplacement to estimate AA fire in three-dimensional space (Spennemann 
and Poynter 2019, 2463). These articles demonstrated that AA fire domes had 
significant benefits for analysing airspace compared to plotting gun positions on a map 
(Spennemann 2017, 218). One particular advantage of mapping airspace is its ability to 
‘both simulate known flight/attack routes and query to what degree they would have 
been exposed to AA fire’ (Spennemann and Poynter 2019, 2476). In 2018, Sprague 
attempted to develop a predicative model for locating B-29 crash sites on the Pacific 
Island of Saipan by plotting three-dimensionally the approach zones to airfields 
(Sprague 2018, 128). These zones, however, were defined generically  and did not take 
into account the actual flightpath of individual aircraft.  
This article takes the concepts developed by Sprague, Spennemann and Poynter, 
and applies them to an urban area in the European Theatre of Operation during the 
Second World War. It combines the airspaces of offence and defence into a more 
complete assessment of an aerial battlefield. The reconstruction in this article is based 
on simplified AA fire domes centred on gun batteries, created using the maximum range 
of the guns deployed. The article will also present a new approach that attempts to plot 
the flightpaths of bombers in three-dimensional space during their bomb runs.  
Reconstructing Norwich’s Defensive Airspace 
The first raid on Norwich during the Second World War occurred on 9 July 1940 and 
involved two aircraft that approached Barnard’s wire factory on Mousehold Heath from 
the northeast at 600ft (185m) (Banger 1989, 12). Not only was there no warning of the 
raid, the aircraft remained in the area, unopposed, for approximately one hour (TNA 
HO 199/63, 3). At this time, Norwich was protected by two ‘QF 3-inch 20cwt’ AA guns 
crewed by 286 Battery, 91st Heavy Anti-Aircraft (HAA) Regiment Royal Artillery 
(RA), with an effective range of 16,000ft (4,900m) (TNA WO 166/2382a; Routledge 
1994, 13). There were also  
‘two machine-gun emplacements near-by [that] were not manned [during the 
raid] … [and the] men [of Barnard’s] were very bitter that there had been no 
anti-aircraft fire or fighters to drive off the raiders’ (TNA HO 199/63, 1).  
Following a number of raids without warnings, it was decided that a series of ‘spotters’ 
should be employed at favourable positions around the city ‘to keep an eye on the sky 
and signal a warning should they observe any indication of hostile activity’ (TNA ZLIB 
10/40, 1). Pooling resources, three companies - Boulton and Paul, Laurence Scott and 
Electromotors, and Reckitt and Colman - erected a scaffold stage for spotters on the 
roof of Carrow House, which was later in the summer replaced by an 85ft (25m) high 
steel pylon tower in the grounds of No. 15 Bracondale. Even though this tower offered 
unobstructed sky views (TNA ZLIB 10/40, 1, 3), attacks continued to occur with no 
alarm being raised, resulting in ‘[g]reat indignation … expressed by all classes of the 
public’ (TNA HO 199/59a, 1). 
Norwich’s AA guns went into action for the first time in August 1940:  
‘at first some alarm was created by the noise thereof, as soon as the population 
realised that they were guns and not bombs their confidence returned and in 
general the people … [were] happier now that they feel they have got some 
protection’ (TNA HO 199/59b).  
At this time, the guns were based at four locations, known as ‘X’, ‘Y’, ‘H’, and ‘F’, and 
were operated by 221 Battery, 91st HAA Regiment RA (TNA WO 166/2382b). Despite 
this increasingly defended airspace, however, enemy aircraft continued to raid the city 
throughout November and December. The enemy aircraft would peel off from 
concentrated attacks on the east coast to bomb Norwich (TNA ZLIB 10/40, 4, 6). Raids 
continued until 8 August 1941, after which the city had a respite from bombing for a 
number of months (TNA ZLIB 10/40, 7; TNA WO 166/189b, 1; Banger 1989, 29). 
By December 1941, it appears that Norwich’s airspace was only defended by 
two AA positions: ‘H2’ and ‘H3’ (TNA WO 166/2396a). During that month, 106th 
HAA Regiment RA had begun preparations to dismantle H2’s guns (TNA WO 
166/2396b). On 3 January 1942, only four 3-inch guns were left to protect Norwich’s 
airspace (TNA WO 166/7280a, 2). With a rate of fire of sixteen to eighteen rounds per 
minute (Routledge 1994, 13), their fire domes would only be filled with a modest 
number of shells. Additional defence by three Bofors and three Lewis guns was 
provided to the airspace around RAF Horsham St Faith, on the northern edge of the city 
(TNA WO 166/7280b, 8). These guns were only intended for localised defence, as the 
Bofor’s optimum engagement range was only 1,500yds (1,372m) (Routledge 1994, 52).  
By April 1942, AA guns were deployed to sites H1 and H2 (TNA WO 
166/7281a). During this month, the Luftwaffe selected Norwich as one of the targets of 
the ‘Baedeker Raids’, a series of attacks on undefended or lightly defended British 
towns of cultural significance following the RAF’s raid on Lübeck, Germany. On the 
night of 27 April, between 25 and 30 aircraft dropped flares onto the city from heights 
between 3,000ft (914m) and 4,000ft (1,219m). Following a short pause, one aircraft at a 
time, flying west to east every two minutes, dropped bombs over the city (TNA HO 
191/184, 1). During this raid, H1 claimed to have destroyed a Junkers JU88 at 2,000ft 
(610m) whilst H2 damaged one at 200ft (61m) (TNA WO 166/7281a). This is one of 
the few written accounts of Norwich’s AA guns successfully shooting down enemy 
aircraft.  
The following night, 28 April, approximately 40 aircraft attacked the city (TNA 
WO 166/7280c, 1). Approaching Norwich from the north at 23:13, the aircraft dropped 
flares, high explosives and incendiary bombs. These two raids resulted in, according to 
one source, the deaths of 196 people and damage to 14,000 houses, of which 1,200 were 
destroyed (TNA HO 199/98a, 3). Compared to the previous night, the opposition from 
ground defences was more pronounced, forcing the attackers to fly at higher altitudes 
(TNA ZLIB 10/40, 9). In total, Norwich’s HAA batteries fired 315 3.7-inch and 465 3-
inch rounds, whilst the light Anti-Aircraft guns fired 80 rounds of 40mm (TNA WO 
166/7280c, 2).  
In the aftermath of the Baedeker Raids, AA Command decided that certain 
towns needed stronger AA protection (TNA WO 166/7280d), and Norwich was 
allocated twelve 3.7-inch mobile AA guns, with a range of 25,000ft (7,620m) 
(Routledge 1994, 57; TNA WO 166/7280e, 1 and Appendix). In addition, the city also 
received a balloon barrage (TNA HO 199/98b, 1). Connected to cables, the balloons 
were intended to force enemy aircraft to fly at higher altitudes, decreasing their 
accuracy and making them easier targets for the AA guns (Penny 1997, 2). By 2 May 
1942, five days after the first raid, 993 Mobile Balloon Squadron had reconnoitred and 
deployed 22 balloons within Norwich’s airspace. This number was increased to 36 by 
the end of the month (TNA AIR 27/2338a). It was the role of this squadron to  
‘give general protection to the entire Norwich area, especially bearing in 
mind the low civilian morale incident upon heavy [sic] attacks at low 
level which occurred when the city was relatively undefended’ (TNA 
AIR 13/42b, 1).  
These balloons were regularly flown over Norwich in the following months at a height 
of 6,500ft (1,981m) when the city was being attacked (TNA AIR 29/858). 
Twelve days after the first Baedeker Raid on Norwich, thirteen Luftwaffe 
aircraft attacked the city again, having broken off from a group of 35 planes operating 
over northeast Norfolk. Flying at an average height of 4,000ft (1,219m), their bombs 
were widely dispersed around the city with few landing in the target area (TNA WO 
166/7281b, 1). Surprised to find new defences, the Luftwaffe’s ‘bombs fell within five 
miles of the Norwich City boundary … [as] the bombers would not face the barrage 
which was very heavy’ (TNA HO 199/98c, 4). 
In August 1942, just three months after the Baedeker Raids, however, the 
number of guns protecting Norwich’s airspace were reduced from twelve to eight 3.7-
inch guns. These were presumably deployed to sites H2 and H3, the only sites 
referenced in the archives as active until February 1943 (TNA WO 166/7281e, 2; TNA 
WO 166/11213a). Although it was standard for AA guns to be deployed in groups of 
four, many sites were only allocated two, but had provision to double up (Dobinson 
2001, 143). As these guns had an effective ceiling of 25,000ft (7,620m) (Routledge 
1994, 57), the airspace above the centre of Norwich was now defended by two 
overlapping fields of fire (Figure 3), still supported by the barrage of 36 balloons 
introduced in May 1942 (TNA HO 199/98b, 1; TNA AIR 27/2338a).  
On 23 February 1943, 383/86 HAA Battery vacated ‘H4’ and ‘H5’ to re-join 
their regiment. This indicates that, at some point prior, these sites had been operational. 
It was around this time that 1 Troop 188 AA ‘Z’ Battery briefly relocated to H5 (TNA 
WO 166/11213a), before returning to ‘NZH2’ on Mousehold Heath on 11 March (TNA 
WO 166/11213b, 1). The Z battery deployed solid-fuel rockets that had an effective 
ceiling of 20,000ft (6,096m) (Routledge 1994, 56). These were most effective when 
targeting mass formation of enemy aircraft (TNA WO 166/11143a, 1). 
Together, H2, H3, H4 and H5 formed ‘Norwich[’s] defences [and] constitute[d 
a] “Baby [Gun Defended Area] G.D.A.” …. controlled by … N.H.2’ (TNA WO 
166/11213c, 1). By November 1943, the number of 3.5-inch AA guns at these sites had 
increased to sixteen (TNA WO 166/11147, 3). At the end of 1944, work had begun to 
wind down the defences of Norwich’s airspace and by 31 October it was reported that 
‘Sites Norwich H.2 and Norwich H.3 are unarmed’ (TNA WO 166/14827).  
Reconstructing Luftwaffe Flightpaths 
To provide a detailed three-dimensional reconstruction of aerial warfare, it is important 
to relate ground-based defences to the flightpaths of attacking aircraft. As mentioned 
earlier, Norwich City Council’s Engineers Department recorded bomb impact locations 
onto the Bomb Map (Figure 1), which allows some reconstructions of attack patterns. 
The Map records with pinned labels the location, type and date of 666 bombs dropped 
on Norwich between 12 February 1940 and 30 March 1945. It is possible that pins have 
fallen out since the war and been replaced in the wrong position; in addition, there are 
169 holes in the map representing missing pins and labels. Further, it is also uncertain 
whether unexploded bombs were recorded. Despite these issues, however, the Norwich 
Bomb Map is an important mapped visual representation of the landscape of aerial 
bombardment.  
Cartographic representations of bombscapes do not take into account the vertical 
dimension of the battlescape. Bombs dropped by aircraft do not fall to the ground by a 
straight vertical trajectory: their path is actually represented by a concave curve. As a 
bomb travels along this path, it covers a distance known as the ‘range’ (Office of the 
Chief of Ordnance 1944, 3, 4). By taking into account the range of a bomb, it is possible 
to build a more accurate depiction of the Norwich aerial battlescape.  
To calculate the range of bombs dropped from aircraft, it is necessary to 
determine the height at which they were released. Unfortunately, the altitudes of aircraft 
bombing Norwich were only recorded on six occasions: 2 August 1942 (TNA AIR 
27/2338b), 5 September 1942 (TNA AIR 27/2338c), 5 December 1942 (TNA WO 
166/7282, 1), 1 January 1943 (TNA WO 166/11143b, 1), 18 March 1943 (TNA WO 
166/11213d) and 5 May 1943 (TNA WO 166/11144, 1). It is possible to identify the 
flight path individual aircraft on these raids through an analysis of the Bomb Map. 
When dropped from a single aircraft, bombs will generally fall in a linear arrangement 
known as a ‘stick’. These will appear in the bombscape as a line of impact points spread 
over a distance. In determining sticks of bombs, it is important to know the type of 
bomb and the payload of the aircraft. The planes raiding Norwich, including the Heinkel 
He-111, typically carried four 500lb (227kg) bombs, or significantly more 50lb (23kg) 
incendiaries. By combining sticks of bombs, with aircraft heights and the range of 
bombs, it is possible to reconstruct part of the flightpaths of bombers through an 
airspace.  
A simple visual analysis of the two-dimensional bombscape of 5 September 
1942, as depicted on the Norwich Bomb Map, could be interpreted as the bombs being 
dropped in a single stick by an aircraft flying through overlapping HAA fields of fire 
(Figure 4). However, by reconstructing the planes flightpath through the airspace, a 
different story emerges. At the time, observers recorded that the plane flew at an 
altitude of 25,000ft (7,620m) (TNA AIR 27/2338c). Bombs dropped from this height 
had a range of approximately 11,000ft (3,353m) (Office of the Chief of Ordnance 1944, 
4). By combining the range of the bombs with the altitude of the aircraft, it is possible to 
plot the bomb run of the plane in three-dimensional space, from which it is clear that the 
aircraft was actually flying outside of the optimum engagement range of the city’s 3.7-
inch guns (Figure 5).  
The bombscape of 5 May 1943 could be interpreted as three aircraft flying in 
formation during their bomb run (Figure 6). If the same methodological approach of 
combining aircraft altitude with bomb range is applied to this raid, it is clear that the 
three aircraft were actually flying independently on different trajectories when they 
dropped their bombs (Figure 7). In this instance, however, it is not possible to determine 
the direction of flight of the planes with the information available. 
Discussion  
Over the course of the Second World War, Norwich’s airspace underwent a series of 
changes due to the introduction of new technology and in response to the evolving 
nature of the threat posed by the Luftwaffe. The evolution of the city’s airspace can be 
categorised into three phases: pre-Baedeker, Baedeker and post-Baedeker.  
In the pre-Baedeker period, the Luftwaffe mainly targeted Norwich’s industrial 
area in the vicinity of the Thorpe Railway Station and Carrow Works, and a small 
number of AA guns defended Norwich’s airspace. By 1940, there were two 3-inch guns 
with fire domes extending 4,900m into the city’s airspace. Norwich was also protected 
by two machine gun positions that were intended for localised defence. Although these 
defences would have provided overlapping fire domes covering the city’s airspace, the 
number of shells that the guns could put up into the air was limited. The QF 3-inch 
20cwt AA gun could only fire sixteen to eighteen rounds per minute (Routledge 1994, 
13), so that the number of aircraft that could be targeted at one time was severely 
restricted, especially with only two guns deployed. Although the guns posed a limited 
military deterrent, they still had a role to play in maintaining morale: when deciding 
whether to fire, the ‘desirability of the guns being heard by the civilians whom they are 
protecting is to be borne in mind’ (TNA WO 166/7280f). Consequently, AA guns 
would be fired even when there was little chance of hitting enemy aircraft as it raised 
the spirit of those sheltering from the bombs (Jones et al. 2004, 477). 
Against the limited defensive capabilities of Norwich’s airspace, the aircraft of 
the Luftwaffe could operate with relative freedom. Up until the Baedeker Raids, the 
pilots were recorded as having conducted their bombing runs at heights between 500ft 
(152m) and 1,200ft (366m) (TNA ZLIB 10/40, 2, 6), with an average height of 850ft 
(259m). At these low levels, the bombers could aim more accurately at their target 
(Figure 8).  
During the first of the Baedeker Raids on Norwich, the bombers flew at heights 
varying between 3,000ft (914m) and 4,000ft (1,219m) (TNA HO 191/184, 1). Although 
the city’s AA guns fired 780 rounds during the second night (TNA 166/7281f), this 
would have been only approximately twelve minutes of continuous fire, assuming there 
were only four AA guns deployed firing sixteen to eighteen rounds per minute. The 
explosives and incendiaries dropped by the bombers on these raids were far more 
dispersed than the pre-Baedeker Raids bombscape. It appears that Norwich’s industrial 
heart was no longer the target; the focus now being domestic housing areas (Figure 9). 
In an attempt to combat the relative freedom of the Luftwaffe pilots to operate 
within Norwich’s airspace during the Baedeker Raids, a balloon barrage and additional 
AA guns were deployed. The balloons were designed to make the 6,500ft (1,981m) of 
vertical space between the cables attaching them to the ground dangerous to the 
attacking aircraft. After the arrival of the balloons, observers recorded Luftwaffe pilots 
flying at heights varying between 200ft (61m) and 25,000ft (7,620m), with an average 
height of 6,281ft (1,914m) (TNA AIR 13/17, 1; TNA AIR 27/2338c). This was 5,431ft 
(1,655m) higher than the average height of enemy aircraft flying over Norwich in the 
pre-Baedeker and Baedeker period. However, the presence of the balloon barrage 
clearly did not deter all pilots from operating within the airspace at low levels.  
By increasing the number of AA guns deployed to Norwich, overlapping fire 
domes with high concentrations of fire protected the city’s airspace. The combination of 
a balloon barrage and increased AA fire made the lower levels of Norwich’s airspace 
more hazardous. By forcing the bombers to fly at higher altitudes, the city’s post-
Baedeker bombscape became more dispersed (Figure 10). This meant that the majority 
of bombs fell in an area of mixed industrial and domestic land coverage with only some 
landing near the industrial areas of Carrow Works and Thorpe Railway Station.  
By combining bomb trajectories with impact locations, it is possible to 
reconstruct the flightpath of an individual aircraft’s bomb run. When this information is 
combined with AA fire domes, it is possible to recreate the airspace of aerial warfare. 
This can shed light on the tactics used by both the city’s defences and its attackers, but 
it only provides a visualisation of a snapshot of the battle. If in future bombscapes can 
be combined with additional data, such as the distribution of searchlights, logbooks of 
both bombers and interceptors, the archaeological excavation of crashed aircraft, ground 
based observation, mission briefings and after mission reports, it might be possible to 
accurately reconstruct the airspaces of historic aerial warfare. This would not only aid 
the studies on the strategic positioning of ground base defences, but also shed light on 
the effectiveness of the UK’s defensive umbrella during the Second World War. In 
addition, by reconstructing airspaces it would be possible to examine the interplay 
between attacker and defender in more detail.   
Conclusion 
Aerial warfare exists in a ‘unique three-dimensional battlefield’ (Young 1990, 62). The 
Italian theorist of air power General Giulio Douhet, wrote in 1921 that the ‘airplane has 
complete freedom of action and direction; it can fly to and from any point of the 
compass in the shortest time – in a straight line – by any route deemed expedient. 
Nothing man can do on the surface of the earth can interfere with a plane in flight, 
moving freely in the third dimension’ (Douhet, tr. Ferrari 1998, 9). The advent of AA 
technology was to prove Douhet over-optimistic. Because aircraft can operate in three-
dimensional space, it is essential that when studying the aerial component of historic 
battles, the vertical element is considered.  
In contrast to the archaeological traces of conflict that exists in the subterranean 
world (Weizman 2017, 254-8, Banks 2014, Barton, Doyle, and Vandewalle 2010, and 
Rodríguez-Gonzálvez et al 2015), aerial warfare leaves a ephemeral impact on the 
three-dimensional battlescape. Although the archaeological excavation of crash sites 
can reveal evidence for the final moments of an aircraft’s flightpath, this was just one 
element of the plane’s journey and a fragment of the battle. It is essential for the holistic 
understanding of aerial warfare that future studies recreate the vertical dimension of the 
battlescape.  
By modelling three-dimensional airspace, scholars can explore data in new ways 
(Richards-Rissetto 2017, 16). This article illustrates the merits of visualising the vertical 
element of aerial warfare by recreating Norwich’s GDA and the flightpath of Luftwaffe 
bombers. In this reconstruction, the city’s defensive airspace was presented as 
simplified fire domes representing the maximum extent of the deployed AA guns. 
Although not as accurate as Spennemann and Poynter’s methodology, a simplified 
dome was sufficient for a visual representation of Norwich’s defended airspace.  
This new approach at reconstructing the flightpath of bombers, requires sticks of 
bombs to be identified in the bombscape. In the case of Norwich, this was aided by the 
survival of a Bomb Map that recorded the date and type of bomb dropped onto the city. 
By combining impact points with the range of the bombs, which is determined by the 
height of the plane at the point of release, as identified through archival research, it is 
possible to estimate the position of the aircraft in the airspace during its bomb run. 
Unfortunately, this methodology cannot determine the direction of an aircraft’s 
approach. To enhance the reconstruction of flightpaths, it would be essential to conduct 
archival research to locate mission briefings, logbooks, or additional ground based 
observations. 
Although this article has focused on the airspace of Norwich’s Baby GDA (an 
essentially local airspace), it is important to remember that this was only one element of 
the national defensive airspace (Penny 1997, 1). Searchlights, fighter interceptors, radar 
and decoys also played an important role in the wider airspace of defence. The 
reconstruction of regional, or even national, airspace, incorporating all these elements, 
would allow an assessment of their relative contribution to the defensive umbrella. If 
the airspace of offence and defence was accurately visualised, it would be possible to 
assess whether they had an iterative reciprocal effect on each other. 
By combining Spennemann and Poynter’s fire domes with the new approach 
presented in this article for reconstructing the flightpath of bomb runs, airspaces of 
cities around the world that were bombed during the Second World War could be 
analysed. It may also be possible to apply this new approach to aerial combat during 
other periods of conflict. By combining Korean and Vietnam War logbooks with post-
strike photographs, ground based defences and other archival sources, the airspace of a 
mission from take-off to landing could be plotted. Consequently, aerial warfare studies 
should continue to develop methodological approaches that reconstruct airspaces of 
defence and offence. 
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